Judgment of 28 September 2026 addresses whether a person facing competing extradition requests may make representations to the Home Secretary before she decides which takes priority under section 179 of the Extradition Act 2003.
R (on the application of Diogo Santos Coelho) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 1219, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), judgment handed down on 28 September 2026. Lady Justice Andrews gave the lead judgment.
The issue. Section 179 applies when the same person is subject to a Part 1 warrant (EU Member States and Gibraltar) and a Part 2 request (other territories, including the USA). The Home Secretary may order proceedings on one to be deferred until the other has been disposed of (paragraphs 30 and 31). The key question was whether procedural fairness requires the person to be able to make representations before that decision is taken (paragraph 1).
The background. The USA made its request on 23 March 2022, and the Home Secretary certified it on 31 March 2022. Portugal issued its warrant on 14 February 2024. On 14 March 2024 the Minister of State for Security decided under section 179(2)(a) to defer proceedings under the Portuguese warrant until the US request had been disposed of (paragraphs 5 to 7). In the High Court, Mr Justice Linden quashed that decision on grounds of procedural unfairness, material errors of fact and irrationality (paragraph 9).
The appeal. The Home Secretary sought permission to appeal on three grounds. The first two were that the judge erred in finding it unfair not to consider representations, and in extending the factors under section 179 to include the interests of the person to be extradited. The third was that the judge erred in concluding that the decision proceeded on a factually incorrect premise, failed to take into account relevant considerations and took into account irrelevant considerations (paragraph 10). The claimant argued that the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction because this was a "criminal cause or matter" under section 18(1)(a) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (paragraph 11).
The lead judgment. Lady Justice Andrews found that the Court has jurisdiction and that permission to appeal should be granted. She would allow the appeal on Grounds 1 and 2 and, save where it overlaps with those grounds, dismiss it on Ground 3. She added that when a fresh decision is taken, it must be taken on an accurate factual basis (paragraph 14).
Later developments. The parties told the Court that the claimant has since been convicted in Portugal in his absence. Portugal has withdrawn its original warrant, and it has been replaced by a conviction warrant. The USA has not withdrawn its request, so a fresh decision under section 179 is needed (paragraph 12). The Court said it would still decide the appeal because it raises important issues of principle likely to arise in other cases.
What this means for applicants
The lead judgment says a fresh section 179 decision must be taken on an accurate factual basis. It also records that the Home Secretary's published guidance on section 179 treats the four statutory factors in section 179(3) as taking primacy (paragraph 32).